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ABSTRACT
The Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi [HDP]) was one of
the leading actors in Turkey’s double parliamentary elections in 2015. Under
the leadership of Selahattin Demirtaş, it has enjoyed great success, crossing
the ten percent threshold and entering parliament in the June 7, 2015
elections. Yet the hype was mitigated by the party’s poorer results in the
November 1, 2015 elections. This electoral performance manifested the
strengths as well as the limits of the HDP’s ability to maintain its support in a
polarized political environment. Yet the HDP remains an indispensable actor
for the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue.
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Introduction
The Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi [HDP]) was
one of the leading actors in the two parliamentary elections that took place
on June 7 and November 1, 2015. Its success in crossing the ten percent
threshold on June 7 became a milestone in the history of the pro-Kurdish
and left-wing political movements in Turkey and was one of the main
reasons for the failure of the incumbent Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AKP]) to win a parliamentary majority. Its co-
president Selahattin Demirtaş emerged as the new charismatic figure of
Turkish politics. While in the November elections the HDP maintained its
percentage above ten percent, the decline in its support contributed to yet
another comfortable parliamentary majority for the AKP. However, the
HDP remains a crucial actor for the resolution of the Kurdish question as
well as for the future of the left in Turkey.
© 2016 Taylor & Francis
CONTACT Ioannis N. Grigoriadis ioannis@bilkent.edu.tr
TURKISH STUDIES, 2016
VOL. 17, NO. 1, 39–46
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2015.1136086
From the fringes to the center of Turkish politics
The HDP is the last in a long series of left-wing political parties that aimed to
represent Turkey’s Kurdish minority. All these parties had to compete under
adverse circumstances and often had limited freedom to campaign.1 In
addition, pro-Kurdish political parties had to face the formidable barrier of
Turkey’s electoral law. One of the main legacies of the 1980–83 military
regime has been a ten percent threshold for the entry of political parties
into the Turkish National Assembly. This was meant to prevent the rise of
Islamist and Kurdish nationalist parties to prominence in Turkish politics.
While this provision is not constitutionally enshrined, it has remained one
of the intrinsic features of the Turkish political party system. Eventually, Isla-
mist political parties were able to cross the threshold and turn this provision
from a political liability to an asset as they grew bigger and consequently mar-
ginalized other conservative political parties. On the other hand, pro-Kurdish
political movements repeatedly failed to cross the ten percent threshold, as a
large number of voters of Kurdish descent objected to their left-wing, secular
orientation and voted instead for other parties on religious and/or economic
grounds. This led pro-Kurdish political parties to formally abstain from elec-
tions and support, instead, independent candidates in the provinces inhabited
by sizable Kurdish populations. This led in 2011 to the election of 36 indepen-
dent MPs, most of whom later formed a parliamentary group.
An additional obstacle for Kurdish political parties has been the Turkish
judiciary. Several pro-Kurdish political parties have been banned by the Con-
stitutional Court since Turkey’s return to civilian rule in 1983 as their statutes,
programs and activities have been found to be against the provisions of Article
68§4 of the Turkish Constitution.2 The HDP is thus the latest in the line of
these parties. It was formally founded in August 2012, but gained more pro-
minence after the delegates of the Kurdish-oriented Peace and Democracy
Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi [BDP]) decided to join the HDP in April
2014.
While the HDP has, since its inception, aimed to shed the badge of being
only a pro-Kurdish party and has tried to establish itself as a secular, left-wing
party with a message that could appeal to a broader constituency, its start was
rather clumsy. On the one hand, its relationship with the Kurdish Workers’
Party (PKK) was—and remains—a sensitive issue. In the eyes of many
Turks, the HDP was merely the political wing of a terrorist organization,
and this shattered HDP’s hopes of enlarging its appeal among Turkish
voters. For its part, the PKK leadership was not comfortable with a rise of a
strong civilian voice within the Kurdish political movement that could chal-
lenge its hegemonic position. Furthermore, the HDP’s relationship with the
AKP government was ambivalent In May and June 2013, the HDP appeared
unable to capture the moment and did not fully embrace the Gezi Park
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protests, which shook the AKP government and became a source of inspi-
ration for a wide array of left-wing social movements. The HDP appeared
to be taking equal distance between the AKP government and the demonstra-
tors and arguably saw the Gezi protests as a potential threat to the Kurdish
peace process.3 This led some to believe that the Kurdish political movement
would be willing to ignore growing authoritarian tendencies of the AKP gov-
ernment in return for a package deal regarding the Kurdish question in the
ongoing peace negotiations.4 In particular, the transformation of the consti-
tutional reform debate from a debate on the promotion of democratic
reform and human rights into a debate about the introduction of a presiden-
tial system had irked secular and liberal Turks. It was therefore feared that the
Kurdish peace process could provide an opportunity for a “grand bargain” in
which Kurdish demands on mother tongue public education and devolution
would be met under the condition of support for the introduction of a presi-
dential system in Turkey.
The first positive signal of the HDP’s ability to navigate through the trea-
cherous waters of Turkish politics was given in the August 10, 2014 presiden-
tial elections, when the HDP candidate and party co-president Selahattin
Demirtaş received 9.76 percent of the vote. With this result, the HDP outper-
formed its predecessors and came very close to the critical ten percent elec-
toral threshold, which would be in play in the 2015 parliamentary elections.
The party also presented a charismatic figurehead. Demirtaş, a member of
the Turkish National Assembly and former mayor of Diyarbakir, emerged
as a political figure that appealed beyond the traditional base of the pro-
Kurdish political movement and injected some long-needed charisma into
the Turkish opposition scene.
Nonetheless, the HDP continued to be viewed with suspicion by some in
the country’s secular elite. This grew when, under the leadership of Demirtaş,
the HDP took the decision to run in the elections as a party and not support
independent candidates. This decision appeared to the eyes of many as very
risky, meaning that it might fail to enter parliament and therefore pave the
way for the continued political hegemony of the AKP. This would be the
case because if it failed to cross the ten percent threshold it would collect
zero seats instead of the 20–25 normally won by independent candidates.
The vast majority of these seats would then pass to the AKP, and this
would greatly facilitate President Erdoğan’s effort to win a qualified majority
sufficient to put forward the introduction of a presidential system. The
absence of a pro-Kurdish party from the Turkish National Assembly would
also lead to a major legitimacy crisis.5
To dispel any suspicions about collusion with the AKP, the HDP and co-
president Demirtaş increased criticism toward the AKP government and Pre-
sident Erdoğan. Demirtaş’s promise “Seni başkan yaptırmayacağız (We shall
not make you president),” meaning that the HDP would never facilitate
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Erdoğan’s plans for constitutional reform with the aim to introduce a presi-
dential system, became one of the defining moments of the election campaign.
Meanwhile the HDP scaled up its efforts to appeal to three crucial voter
groups that did not count among the core voters of its predecessor pro-
Kurdish political parties. The first was conservative voters of Kurdish
ethnic descent, who in the past backed mainstream conservative Turkish pol-
itical parties and had been core supporters of the AKP since its meteoric rise
to power in 2002. The second group was voters of Kurdish ethnic descent who
had immigrated to Turkey’s big cities, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, who also
normally voted for mainstream political parties. The third group consisted
of liberal secular voters of Turkish or at least non-Kurdish ethnic descent
who had grown disillusioned by all the mainstream Turkish political parties
and believed that the Turkish political party system could not represent
them. Strengthening its appeal among all three groups was sine qua non for
the HDP to cross the ten percent threshold. The party was rebranded as a
“Türkiyeli” party, representing all the ethnic groups of the Republic of
Turkey, including the Turks.
The solution of the Kurdish problem was thus defined in the context of the
resumption of the democratization process and the advancement of human
rights protection for all Turkish citizens. Thus, the HDP ceased to be
simply a “pro-Kurdish” party and aimed to grow into a party that addressed
the grievances and concerns of all dispossessed Turkish citizens, no matter
their ethnicity. It also incorporated in its political agenda key demands of
the Gezi movement on human and environmental rights protection, building
a left-of-center profile. In particular, it signaled that it would not trade con-
cessions regarding Kurdish minority rights for acquiescence to the growing
authoritarian tendencies of the AKP government and the introduction of a
presidential system by constitutional reform. Launching an election campaign
not limited to the grievances of the Kurdish minority of the country was no
easy task, as the party had to build confidence among Turkish secularists.
The HDP appealed to the Turkish secular middle class, which was strongly
disappointed by the policies of the AKP government and opposed the intro-
duction of a presidential system, as it saw this development as a further step
toward the decline of the quality of Turkish democracy. Appealing to the
secular middle class also required taking a more assertive stance against
PKK terrorism. Gaining credibility on this issue without losing support
among Kurdish voters required very delicate moves by Demirtaş.
The HDP in the 2015 elections
In 2015, these efforts bore some fruit. In the June 7, 2015 elections, the HDP
comfortably crossed the ten percent threshold and collected 6,058,489 votes,
13.12 percent of the total. This performance secured 80 seats in the 550
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member National Assembly, more than tripling its result compared to the
previous elections of 2011. A closer look into the results district by district
would confirm that the party was able to substantially increase its appeal
among all three aforementioned groups. Moreover, the increase of the
HDP’s vote and its entry to the parliament was one of the main reasons for
the failure of the AKP to secure a parliamentary majority for the first time
since 2002.6
These results briefly raised hopes that a non-AKP coalition government
could be formed, bringing the HDP into power. Yet these hopes were soon
dashed, as detailed in this special section by Ersin Kalaycıoğlu. The failure
of the three opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi [CHP]), the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi
[MHP]) and the HDP to form a coalition government was mainly due to
the categorical opposition of the far-right nationalist MHP to join any
coalition with the HDP. This played into the hands of the AKP and President
Erdoğan who took an increasingly active role in post-election political man-
euvering. They argued that Turkey could not afford instability and weak
coalition governments following 13 years of single-party AKP governments
that were instrumental in securing stability and economic growth. Pressure
to form a strong, single-party government increased in July, when the end
of the ceasefire with the PKK and the resumption of violence raised inter-
ethnic tensions and brought again the specter of war after several years of rela-
tive calm.
Another key lever in AKP’s efforts to recover lost ground against the HDP
was its claims about the relationship between the HDP and the PKK. As the
Kurdish peace process stumbled and hostilities between Turkish security and
the PKK forces recurred, the AKP and pro-government media persistently
accused the HDP of being an accomplice, if not a puppet, of a terrorist organ-
ization. Despite repeated statements by Demirtaş that aimed to clearly differ-
entiate the HDP and the PKK, this did not gain much political traction due to
variety of opinions within the party as well as interventions by the interred
PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK leadership based in Kandil in
northern Iraq. The HDP appeared unable to convincingly distinguish itself
from the PKK and terrorist violence and thus prove that it could really lead
and represent Turkey’s Kurdish minority, let alone ethnic Turks.
In addition to violence between the PKK and the Turkish state, terrorist
attacks both prior to and after the June elections affected the HDP and con-
tributed to a polarized environment. In particular, three major terrorist
attacks targeted the HDP. On June 5, 2015, four persons were killed and
about 100 were injured by two bomb explosions during the main election
rally of the HDP in the city of Diyarbakir. On July 20, 2015, a suicide
bomb attack killed 33 Turkish and Kurdish youths in Suruç, a town next to
the Syrian border. The victims were about to cross the border and offer
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humanitarian aid to the residents of Kobane, one of Syria’s most war-torn
towns which had become a symbol for Kurdish resistance against the advan-
cing jihadist forces of the “Daesh” or “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).”
Finally, on October 10, 2015, two suicide bombers targeted a demonstration
in Ankara that was organized by the HDP and other leftist organizations to
demand a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue. More than 100 people
were killed and 400 were injured in what proved as the bloodiest single act
of terrorism in republican Turkish history. However, the attacks on the
HDP did not prove beneficial from the electoral point of view. While all
three were linked with “Daesh” cells in Turkey, in particular one in the
eastern city of Adiyaman, public opinion did not consider the government
responsible for negligence in tracking such terrorist activities. On the con-
trary, many backed the government’s call for stability and strong rule. All
three terrorist attacks polarized the already strained relations among the con-
servative, the secular and the Kurdish elements within Turkey and made the
appeal to national unity under a strong AKP government more attractive.
The results of the November 1 parliamentary elections demonstrate that
the AKP government’s rhetoric did in fact resonate with the three crucial
voter groups that had shifted their support toward the HDP in the June
2015 elections and mobilized voters who had abstained from the June elec-
tions. In the latter elections, the HDP collected 5,148,085 votes, 10.76
percent of the total, thus securing 59 seats in the National Assembly.
Losing over two percent of the vote or about 900,000 votes and 21 seats
was certainly a major disappointment. It appeared that the HDP suffered
losses in all three critical voter groups, which had voted for it for the first
time in the June 7, 2015 elections. A sizeable part of conservative and immi-
grant Kurdish voters who had voted for the HDP for the first time were con-
vinced by the AKP that instability was the biggest threat for their interests.
Many abstained from the elections or voted for a strong, single-party AKP
government.7 Scaling up the rhetoric against the HDP and identifying it
with the PKK found resonance with a substantial part of Turkish public
opinion, which was ambivalent in its stance vis-à-vis the HDP. Raising the
specter of military confrontation also made it more difficult for members of
the Turkish secular middle class to vote for a party which in the eyes of
many was still identified with Kurdish nationalism and secessionism.
Nevertheless, one should put the electoral performance of November 1 into
perspective. Despite the electoral decline and the disillusionment that this
caused, the HDP remained comfortably above the ten percent threshold,
establishing itself as the fourth biggest political party in the Turkish political
scene. Its prospects will greatly depend on its adaptability to the multiple chal-
lenges it faces, the leadership skills of Demirtaş and the overall course of
Turkish politics. The consolidation of the transformation of the HDP into a
center-left party aiming to give voice and represent all the dispossessed of
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Turkish society would boost the chances for the resolution of the Kurdish
conflict. Yet developments remain anything but promising. On November
28, 2015, the president of the Diyarbakir Bar Association and prominent
human rights activist, Tahir Elçi, was assassinated during a press conference
in Diyarbakir. Some weeks before his assassination, Elçi had attracted the ire
of Turkish nationalists and had been even detained. The reason was his claim
in a TV talk show that “PKK is not a terrorist organization.” This brought to
mind some of the darkest pages of Turkish politics of the 1990s and pointed at
the reversibility of all the positive steps made over the last decade. As the legit-
imate political representative of the Kurdish political movement, the HDP
remains an indispensable actor for the resumption of the peace talks, as
well as for the rejuvenation of the Turkish left. Given the traditions of
Turkish politics, much of the burden of this will fall onto the shoulders of
the party’s leader, Selahattin Demirtaş. The success of the HDP to remain
at the center stage of Turkish politics may be one of the last chances for
the peaceful resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish question.
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Notes
1. Grigoriadis, “Political Participation of Turkey’s Kurds and Alevis,” 448–53.
2. According to Article 68§4:
The statutes and programs, as well as the activities of political parties shall not
be contrary to the independence of the State, its indivisible integrity with its ter-
ritory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law,
sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic;
they shall not aim to promote or establish class or group dictatorship or dicta-
torship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime.
3. See, for example, Yavuz, “Demirtaş.”
4. Bursalı, “Seçim Sonrası-3.”
5. Gürsel, “Kürtler Her Durumda Kazanıyor.”
6. See KONDA, KONDA 7 Haziran. Sandık ve Seçmen Analizi.
7. On these, see KONDA, KONDA Kasım ’15 Seçim Barometresi.
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